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ver the past five years, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets have received heightened regulatory attention, due 
to their opaqueness, size and interconnectedness, with a view to improving the robustness, safety and resilience of this 
market segment. There has been continued progress in the follow-up to the G-20 commitments, with the EU (EMIR, 
MIFID II, CRD/CRR IV, MAD) and the US (Swap Execution Facility or SEF, Title VII of Dodd-Frank Act, Basel III) leading 
in the implementation timelines and capturing approximately 80-90% of the overall market. Based on the data compiled for the 
yearly ECMI Statistical Package, this commentary provides a snapshot of the current status of the global OTC derivatives markets 
by: i) identifying general trends over the past decade, ii) looking at the changes in the market structure (instruments and 
participants), iii) estimating the uncollateralised derivatives exposure and iv) examining the relationship between OTC 
derivatives and exchange-traded derivatives (ETD). 
 
Recent market developments 
Trends in OTC (over-the-counter) derivatives markets 
can be identified by tracking in parallel 
upward/downward movements in the gross notional 
value of outstanding contracts and the gross market 
value. Over the past seven years, however, the 
notional amount outstanding has been altered by the 
increasing uptake of central clearing and the growing 
use of portfolio compression services or other risk-
mitigation procedures. Central clearing increases the 
reported notional amounts outstanding due to double-
counting. When bilateral counterparties, A and B, 
centrally clear a contract, this is replaced by an 
equivalent contract between A and a CCP (central 
counterparty) and another equivalent contract between 
B and the same CCP. Multilateral netting performed 
by the CCPs is assumed to be four times more 
effective than bilateral netting. This, in turn, is 
expected to reduce the margins to be posted. 
Compression of both bilateral and cleared trades, on 
the other hand, reduces the notional outstanding as 
economically redundant transactions can be ‘torn up’ 
                                                     
1 In effect, the systemic risk in this market is connected to 
the volatility in the underlying markets, liquidity and 
counterparty risk. 
and replaced with a smaller set of trades. Despite these 
distortions on notional values, three main trends 
(Figure 1) emerged from reaction to market events: 1) 
the financial crisis or the European sovereign debt 
crisis (phase ‘a’ and ‘c’), 2) endogenous market 
structure adjustments (phase ‘b’ and ‘d’), and 3) 
potential structural effects caused by more exogenous 
factors (phase ‘e’).  
In the last decade, the OTC derivatives market showed 
an impressive rate of growth, reaching its peak at end-
2013 with more than $710 trillion in notional amounts 
outstanding. Although the OTC derivatives market did 
not trigger the financial crisis, cases such as the 
collapse of AIG and Lehman Brothers took centre 
stage and brought to the fore the systemic importance 
of derivatives for the overall financial system.1 From 
June to December 2008, the notional value of all types 
of OTC contracts (market activity) went down by 
11.06% while the market value soared by 73.46% to 
$35 trillion. The gross credit exposure hit a record high 
of $5 trillion, with only limited collateralised 
exposure. 
O 
Note: The main G20 areas of commitment were: i) central clearing of standardised OTC derivatives, ii) exchange/electronic platform trading of 
standardised OTC derivatives, iii) trade reporting to trade repositories , iv) initial and variation margin requirements for non-centrally cleared 
OTC derivatives and v) bank capital requirements for derivatives exposures. In April, BCBS (2014a) published standards for calculating 
regulatory capital for banks' exposures to central counterparties (CCPs), which will take effect on 1 January 2017. In 2014, the following 
international standards and/or guidance are expected: i) a report from IOSCO, in consultation with BCBS and CPSS, on risk mitigation standards 
for non-centrally cleared derivatives; ii) publications by the FSB and CPSS-IOSCO on the resolution and recovery of financial market 
infrastructures (FMIs), including CCPs and iii) CPSS-IOSCO safeguards and quantitative disclosure standards for CCPs. 
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Figure 1. Notional amounts outstanding, gross market value, gross credit exposure of OTC derivatives ($ tn)* 
 
* The notional amount outstanding represents a market size indicator and is defined as the gross nominal or notional value of all deals concluded 
and not yet settled on the reporting date. However, this amount is generally not entirely exposed to risk. The amount at risk in derivatives 
contracts is a function of the price level and/or volatility of the underlying asset/market variable used in the determination of contract payments, 
the maturity and liquidity of contracts and the creditworthiness of counterparties.  In addition, they also depend on whether an exchange of 
principal actually takes place between counterparties. The gross market value represents the cost of replacing all outstanding contracts at 
current market prices. Finally, gross credit exposure looks at the gross market values after legally enforceable bilateral netting but before 
collateral is taken out. These two last measures might be better measures of risk. 
Source: BIS (2014). 
Uncertainty about counterparty risk increased the fear 
of another bankruptcy like Lehman Brothers, thereby 
driving up the risk of systemic losses derived from 
knock-on effects (also called ‘cascade’ effects) and a 
chain of banks bankruptcies. As widespread 
government intervention alleviated market pressures, 
by the end of December 2009, market activity 
recovered modestly by 1%, whereas the gross market 
value dropped by 43.14%. The latter indicator 
signalled better underlying market conditions with a 
decline in market volatility and stabilising interest rate 
levels and credit spreads. 
Although the worst part of the crisis was over, the 
underlying market stability did not last for long. As the 
European sovereign debt crisis started in the first half 
of 2010, market activity continued to rise, surpassing 
pre-crisis levels in June 2011 ($706 trillion), while the 
market value of exposures constantly decreased but 
with more volatility due to uncertainty in the sovereign 
bond markets in particular. Between June and 
December 2011, in particular, the markets went 
through another round of turbulence due to fears of a 
euro-area break-up. The issuance of new instruments 
decreased and the market value of exposures sharply 
sloped upwards, with a remarkable increase of 40% – 
the highest level recorded since end-2008. This largely 
happened in the interest rate derivatives segment with 
volatility returning to the high peaks of October 2008. 
After December 2011, a massive intervention by the 
                                                     
2 Data available at www.swapsinfo.org. 
ECB to cool down funding costs for eurozone banks 
improved market conditions, reflected once again in 
lower market activity and lower gross market value of 
exposure (contracting by 10%). 
Finally, and most interestingly, from December 2012 
to the present, a decoupling of investment trends in 
derivatives from underlying market conditions can be 
observed. While the notional amounts outstanding 
increased steadily, indicating higher market activity – 
driven perhaps by uncertainty about the future 
outlook, the gross market value continues to decline, 
as reflected in improved market conditions. More data 
on trade counts collected by ISDA2 confirms a 
structural upward trend in market activity in the last 
two years and most recently a drop caused by the 
increasingly widespread use of compression services.   
Evolution of market structure:  
Instruments and participants  
The distribution of derivatives transactions amongst 
the different instruments has remained relatively 
constant over the past decade (as shown in Figure 2). 
Interest rate derivatives (IRD) are the largest segment 
with an average market share of 73%, followed by the 
foreign exchange derivatives (FX) category that 
account for 13%. Credit default swaps (CDS), equity-
linked and commodities derivatives represent together 
approximately 7% of the overall market. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of OTC derivatives by asset class (% of notional amounts outstanding) 
 
Source: BIS (2014). 
Prior research suggests3 that the OTC derivatives 
market is concentrated, with a highly interconnected 
set of ‘core’ participants dominating a less 
interconnected ‘periphery’ representing the non-
financial entities. 
Figure 3 confirms that over 85%-90% of notional is 
being handled by reporting dealers and other financial 
institutions.  
Figure 3. Distribution of OTC derivatives by counterparty (% of notional amounts outstanding) 
 
Source: BIS (2014). 
A change within the category of financial institutions, 
however, can be observed. In the past five years, some 
dealers exited the derivatives markets or reduced their 
involvement in OTC derivatives market-making due 
to a refocusing of their business models, capital 
shortages or deleveraging, while other financial 
institutions entered the market for business or risk-
management purposes. The latter group includes 
central counterparties, banks, funds and non-bank 
financial institutions, which may be considered as 
financial end users (e.g. mutual funds, pension funds, 
                                                     
3 See Craig and von Peter (2010), Valiante (2010, 2012), 
Markose (2012), Langfield, Liu and Ota (2013). 
hedge funds, insurance companies and others). In 
addition, the portion represented by the non-financial 
entities has slightly declined from the levels prior to 
the financial crisis. Most notably, at the end of 2013 
the non-financial institutions accounted only for 
4.12% of the market activity. This may be the result of 
a reduction in hedging activities due to either sluggish 
economic activity/uncertain business prospects or 
anticipated rise in the total cost of OTC derivatives 
use.4 
4 Both the Dodd-Frank Act and EMIR include clearing 
exemptions for sovereigns, supranationals and corporates 
(subject to thresholds in the EU) that use derivatives to 
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An update on central clearing 
According to FSB (April 2014),5 central clearing of 
OTC derivatives remains most well established for 
interest rate and credit derivatives, while limited 
progress has been made in other asset classes. At the 
end of February 2014, the cleared segment of IRD 
measured approximately $191 trillion on a single-
count basis. This represented around 59% of the 
transactions that could be cleared on CCPs’ current 
platforms ($325 trillion, i.e. single-currency interest 
rate swaps, forward rate agreements, basis swaps and 
overnight indexed swaps) and 46% of G15 dealers’ 
notional amounts outstanding ($413 trillion) reported 
to the DTCC.6 Roughly $80 trillion of IRD cannot be 
cleared by current CCPs platforms (swaptions, cross 
currency swaps, options, inflation swaps widely used 
by corporates, pension funds and insurance 
companies), plus approximately $10 trillion in 
clearable IRD in non-clearable currencies and $35-55 
trillion in IRD with non-financials.  
For credit derivatives, the gross notional outstanding 
amount across all market participants (not just large 
dealers, and adjusted for multiple-counting) was $18 
trillion at end-February 2014. Around $8.2 trillion 
(47%) of this total amount outstanding could be 
centrally cleared given, existing credit derivatives 
clearing offerings of CCPs, while $3.3 trillion (19%) 
of the total amount outstanding had in fact been 
centrally cleared. 
In line with recent market developments, IMF (2010) 
analysis suggests that a substantial fraction of the 
derivatives market will remain uncleared.7 One-
quarter of interest rate swaps, one-third of credit 
default swaps and two-thirds of other OTC derivatives 
will not be sufficiently standardised, liquid, or 
complex to be cleared. With regard to compression, 
market participants have eliminated $239 trillion in 
notional IRD since 2009, according to the post-trade 
infrastructure provider TriOptima. The amount 
compressed includes $185.5 trillion of cleared and 
$53.9 trillion of non-cleared IRD. According to ISDA 
                                                     
hedge commercial risk. A three-year carve-out for 
European pension funds was also included in EMIR.  
5 In the US, mandatory central clearing is in effect for 
specified classes of interest rate swaps (fixed-to-floating, 
basis, forward rates, overnight index swaps) and index 
credit default swaps for major swap participants and so-
called active funds; for commodity pools, banks and private 
funds; and for accounts managed by third-party investment 
managers, pension plans and other entities. In the EU, the 
first mandatory clearing obligations are expected in Q4 
2014 or early 2015. 
6 DTCC data are used. Close to 99% of BIS data on the IRD 
and CDS notional amounts outstanding had been reported 
to DTCC GTR. The BIS semi-annual survey has reported 
amounts outstanding that range from 1% to 3% higher than 
the DTCC GTR for IRD. The main difference between the 
(2013), a cumulative amount of $85 trillion of CDS 
has been compressed since 2007, including $20.3 
trillion in the past three years. 
Estimating the uncollateralised OTC 
derivatives exposure 
Reducing the counterparty risk is an important part of 
reforming OTC derivatives markets. This is expected 
to follow from better collateralisation of OTC 
derivatives exposures, either through bilateral credit 
support agreements or central clearing. At the end of 
2013, according to ISDA (2014a), over 90% of 
bilateral OTC transactions were subject to collateral 
agreements with cash and government securities 
accounting for roughly 90% of the $3.2 trillion 
estimated amount of collateral in circulation. The 
reported collateral received and delivered against 
$407 trillion in notional amounts outstanding of 
centrally cleared OTC derivative transactions totalled 
roughly $295 trillion. 8 
At end of 2013, the estimated uncollateralised 
exposure amounted to $1.45 trillion (see Figure 4), 
representing 47.72% of the gross credit exposure. As 
a result of current reforms and technological 
developments, the uncollateralised exposure has been 
constantly going down as the market developed, even 
before the crisis and despite the growth of volumes in 
the market. After the initial spike in uncollateralised 
exposure during the worst moment of the financial 
crisis, the combination of risk aversion, between end 
of 2008 and 2009, and market reforms, in the last 
couple of years, have pushed additional 
collateralisation into the system. These results are in 
line with a number of studies that looked at the 
expected increase in collateralisation as part of the 
envisaged OTC derivatives markets reforms. 
According to a report prepared by the Macroeconomic 
Assessment Group on Derivatives (MAGD, 
September 2013), these reforms  will result in the total 
amount of collateral used to back trades rising to 
two reference sources is that the DTCC GTR is more 
granular and includes data based on the ISDA product 
taxonomy. 
7 Higher initial and variation margin requirements for non-
centrally cleared OTC derivatives to be phased in from 
December 15th to November 19th.  
8 The ISDA Margin Surveys track the gross amount of 
collateral defined as the sum of all collateral delivered and 
all collateral received by survey respondents. It does not 
adjust for double-counting of collateral assets, which takes 
at least two forms. The first occurs when one survey 
respondent delivers collateral to or receives collateral from 
another respondent. The second source of double-counting 
is collateral re-use, sometimes called re-hypothecation, 
where collateral is delivered from one party to another and 
then delivered to a third party, and so on. 
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between €1.1 trillion and €1.8 trillion, with a central 
estimate of €1.3 trillion. 
As a side note, it is essential to optimise the use of 
collateral and to make collateral pools more fungible 
by promoting interoperating CCPs (mainly through 
cross-margining agreements) in order for the benefits 
promised by central clearing to be effectively 
delivered. However, while CCPs have a valuable 
function in reducing counterparty risk compared to the 
regime of bilateral exposure, they are not a panacea for 
eliminating it. CCPs face a wide range of risks, such 
as legal, credit, liquidity, investment and operational 
risks and may become a new source of systemic risk 
for financial markets if not properly managed. It is 
therefore of the utmost importance for CCPs to 
establish adequate levels of capital, a risk-based 
effective margining system, a robust default 
management waterfall structure as well as clear 
governance and conduct requirements for all members 
in order to prevent that e global OTC derivatives 
reforms from simply substituting one group of ‘too big 
to fail’ (TBTF) entities for another.9 At this stage, the 
issue of setting up viable arrangements for providing 
central bank liquidity to CCPs as a last line of defence 
remains very complicated. 
In the EU, EMIR provides the regulatory and 
supervisory framework for CCPs. These are subject to 
organisational, conduct of business and prudential 
requirements defined in the ESMA’s Regulatory 
Technical Standards (No. 152/2013 and 153/2013) 
covering points such as capital requirements, 
margining, default fund, liquidity risk controls, 
segregation and portability of positions and collateral, 
investment policy and stress testing. On 5 October 
2012, the Commission launched a consultation on a 
possible framework for the recovery and resolution of 
financial institutions other than banks, including 
CCPs, CSDs, and proposals are expected in Q4 2014. 
In the US, the FSOC (Financial Stability Oversight 
Council) is authorised under Title VIII, section 131, of 
the Dodd-Frank Act to designate a Financial Market 
Utility (FMU) as ‘systemically important’ in cases 
where a failure or a disruption to the functioning of an 
FMU could create, or increase, the risk of significant 
liquidity or credit problems spreading among financial 
institutions or markets and thereby threaten the 
stability of the US financial system. Currently 
designated FMUs, including five clearing entities 
supervised by the Board, the CFTC or the SEC, are 
subject to heightened prudential and supervisory 
provisions aimed at promoting robust risk 
management, safety and soundness.  
With regard to international standards and/or guidance 
for FMIs, including CCPs, the consultation periods for 
both the CPSS and IOSCO consultation report on 
recovery of FMIs and the FSB implementation 
guidance on FMI resolution have now closed, and both 
final reports are expected to be published in Q3 2014.10 
Figure 4. Estimation of the uncollateralised exposure * 
 
 
* Collateralisation further reduces gross credit exposure. In order estimate the level of under-collateralisation, 50% of the collateral in 
circulation (as estimated in the ISDA Margin Surveys) is subtracted from the gross credit exposure (as reported in the BIS semiannual surveys).  
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on BIS and ISDA data. 
Trade execution requirements 
It is useful to look at the evolution of the OTC 
derivatives and ETD notional amounts outstanding 
and their market shares relative to the overall trading 
activity to identify if business has shifted from the 
OTC space to exchange-based trading. There is little 
                                                     
9 See Lannoo (2014). 
evidence (Figure 5) that the market share of the 
(electronic) trading platforms has gathered steam. On 
the contrary, the ratio of exchange-traded derivatives 
to overall derivatives trading seems to have decreased 
slightly after 2009, from approximately 11% to 8.85% 
at the end of 2013, with a corresponding opposite trend 
in the OTC derivatives market share. 
10 See CPSS-IOSCO (2013, 2012), FSB (2013). 
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Figure 5. OTC versus ETD activity11 
a) notional amounts outstanding ($ tn)                                       b) market share (%) 
          
Sources: Authors’ own calculations from BIS and WFE data.                
These findings have to be interpreted in the context of 
mandatory trading obligations not being in force in 
many jurisdictions. In the US, the requirement to 
execute certain IRD and CDS on Swap Execution 
Facilities (SEFs) and Designated Contract markets 
(DCMs) took effect only on 15 February 2014 for 
market participants. While an initial regional market 
fragmentation in the Euro IRS emerged, caused by the 
obligation to trade with US person on US SEFs (ISDA, 
2014b), it is early to make a final assessment on the 
impact of trading obligations. Effects will become 
clearer when the EU will complete its piece of 
financial reforms. In effect, the EU agreed on the 
MiFID 2 in Q2 2014 and is now working to finalise 
the technical details of the legislation. This legislation 
is likely to come into force at the end of 2016 at the 
earliest, formalising the already voluntary moves that 
EU participants have made towards a greater use of 
organised trading platforms (such as MTFs), already 
used under existing legislation for trading of some 
derivatives and fixed income. 
Conclusions 
 Over the past five years, the OTC derivatives 
market showed an impressive resilience in levels 
of market activity, which are now above pre-
crisis levels in outstanding notional value. This 
confirms its systemic importance. Current 
volatility of the gross market values and gross 
credit exposures can be attributed to the uncertain 
market conditions for the global economy. 
 Distribution of derivatives instruments has 
remained relatively constant over the past decade. 
Central clearing and portfolio compression is 
developing fast for interest rate and credit 
                                                     
11 BIS data have been supplemented by World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) data on exchange-traded commodities 
derivatives. The amounts outstanding of commodities derivatives were estimated by discounting the total end-year notional 
turnover value of commodities options and futures by a 'decompressing factor' equal to 0.0338977. This methodology was used 
in D. Valiante (2013), Commodities Price Formation: Financialisation and Beyond, CEPS-ECMI Task Force Report, pp. 32-
33, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. 
derivatives, while progress in other asset classes 
is fairly slow.  
 The OTC derivatives market is structured with a 
highly interconnected system of financial 
institutions. But composition is changing from a 
dealer-driven business to a more diversified 
environment, with other financial institutions 
(such as CCPs and investment funds) playing a 
greater role. 
 Uncollateralised exposure is estimated in 
constant decline as a result of better 
collateralization of OTC derivatives exposures, 
either through bilateral collateral agreements or 
the use of CCPs, and improvement of market 
conditions.  
 A structural shift of OTC derivatives to organised 
trading platforms is still not happening. Despite 
high volumes of on-exchange commodity 
derivatives and increasing volumes of interest 
rate derivatives traded on organized platforms, 
the market for OTC derivatives continues to be 
bigger than the exchange-traded side of the 
market, but the situation may rapidly change as 
the trading obligations gradually enter into force 
across key jurisdictions. 
It is too early to conduct a comprehensive assessment 
of the effectiveness of the regulatory reforms in 
meeting the G-20’s underlying objectives of 
increasing transparency, mitigating systemic risk and 
protecting against market abuse in the OTC 
derivatives market. The benefits and costs of the 
underway reforms will largely depend on how these 
will interact with derivatives portfolios and affect the 
structure of the derivatives market more broadly. 
There are multiple factors that may influence the 
impact of OTC regulatory reforms, such as the netting 
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efficiency, collateral availability, market liquidity, 
exposures fragmentation, margining pro-cyclicality 
and market volatility, safeguards for CCPs, changes in 
hedging practices and risk-taking behavior and cross-
border regulation. 
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